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Article 9

The State Secrets Privilege and the Abdication of
Oversight
“In proportion as the nation’s statecraft is increasingly devoted to the
gainful pursuit of international intrigue, . . . it will necessarily take on a
more furtive character, and will conduct a larger proportion of its
ordinary work by night and cloud.” . . . The people . . . would tend to
accept this in a complaisant, even grateful, spirit on the growing
conviction that night and cloud best provided for national security.1

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
National Security Agency (NSA), alleging constitutional violations
resulting from a secret domestic surveillance program.2 The New York
Times published leaked information about this secret program the
previous December,3 raising civil libertarians’ concerns about
unsupervised surveillance of Americans.4 This suit recalls a series of
actions brought 28 years earlier by Vietnam War protesters who also had
been the subjects of NSA surveillance,5 and raises the same issues of
secrecy, national security, and the constitutional rights of individuals.
The federal judiciary has been presented with the opportunity to revisit
and reconsider the state secrets privilege by this and other cases in which
the government has recently claimed the privilege.6
1. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 337 (First Mariner Books
2004) (1973) (quoting THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP 444 (1954)).
2. Complaint at 2, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 2:06-cv-10204), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/
asset_upload_file137_23491.pdf; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Sues to
Stop Illegal Spying on Americans, Saying President Is Not Above the Law (Jan. 17, 2006), available
at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/23486prs20060117.html.
3. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Let U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
4. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Demands Records
About Warrantless Spying by National Security Agency (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://
www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/23150prs20051220.html.
5. See Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978); and Halkin v. Helms
(Halkin II), 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
6. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Ore. 2006) (suit
by alleged subject of communications interceptions against President Bush for, inter alia, violation
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in monitoring telephone conversations through the
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The state secrets privilege is a common law doctrine of evidence that
allows a court to refuse to admit evidence in civil trials when the
executive claims that disclosure would jeopardize national security.7 It
was first crystallized during the Cold War and has since been invoked
many times to obstruct discovery requests in a wide variety of tort
actions against the government and between parties privy to sensitive
government information.8
The Cold War indelibly altered the executive branch’s attitude
toward information to a stricter and more pervasive use of secrecy, and
away from the candor and disclosure that characterized the government’s
use of information before World War II.9 The abuses of executive
secrecy in the late 1960s and early 1970s that surrounded Vietnam policy
and the Watergate scandal created a public furor, but ultimately did not
change judicial doctrine concerning the state secrets privilege.
Surprisingly, in the years that followed the Watergate scandal and other
revelations of the abuse of secrecy, the judiciary interpreted its executive
secrecy doctrine in a way that strengthened and expanded the ability of
the government to deny information to litigants.10 The state secrets
privilege has become so ingrained in the public consciousness and
government practice that to question its legitimacy may seem

secret NSA program); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (suit by AT&T
customers for violation of privacy rights pursuant to AT&T’s participation in the secret NSA
program); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (suit similar in its facts to
Terkel); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (suit by a German citizen against
former CIA director George Tenet for, inter alia, alleged kidnapping, illegal detention, abusive
interrogation, and “extraordinary rendition” to Afgahnistan, resulting in extended imprisonment and
torture); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (suit by an individual of dual
Syrian/Canadian citizenship for alleged wrongful detention and “extraordinary rendition” to Syria,
also resulting in extended imprisonment and torture); Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d
65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005)
(suit by former FBI employee for alleged wrongful termination after “blowing the whistle” on FBI
failures related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
7. See generally James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966);
MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL HOFFMAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL SECURITY: SECRECY AND
SURVEILLANCE 98–115 (1977); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 332–40 (Carolina Academic Press 2005); Note, The Military and
State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91
YALE L.J. 570 (1982) [hereinafter Military & State Secrets Privilege].
8. See J. Steven Gardner, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: A Proposal
for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 584 n.170–71 (1994) (indicating that the
privilege was used in only five cases between 1951 and 1970, and had been used over 50 times
between 1970 and 1994, the year of the article’s publication).
9. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 331–36 (concluding that before World War II
the national government used secrecy only sporadically and in an extremely limited fashion); see
also id. at 43–46 (showing that the general rule in the early republic, accepted by presidents of the
founding generation, of all political persuasions, was that Congress and the public were entitled to
all information requested from the executive with few and extremely narrow exceptions).
10. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 977; Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 1.
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anachronistic, especially, as now, in a time of perceived threat.
On the other hand, though the use of the state secrets privilege is not
controversial, it should be considered as controversial for the purpose of
reassessing its compatibility with constitutional principles.11 Just as the
constitutional role of the judiciary has become a lightening rod for public
debate, so too should the executive’s assertions of its secrecy
prerogative. This is especially true in the War Against Terrorism. The
confluence of a grave threat from international terrorism, public anger
and fear resulting from high-profile terrorist attacks, and an ambitious
presidency intent upon expanding executive power12 have created strong
incentives for the president to push for more latitude to operate in
secrecy, and for Congress and the public to acquiesce to executive
demands.
Thus the War Against Terrorism again presents the American
republic with questions about the propriety of executive secrecy. In
response to the terrorist threat, the Bush administration has taken
extraordinary actions using secrecy as one of its main tools. It used
misinformation based on classified intelligence to promote the Iraq War.
It classifies American citizens as “enemy combatants” using undisclosed
facts and then detains them indefinitely, denying their Sixth Amendment
rights.13 It ordered the secret and probably illegal surveillance of
American citizens by the NSA.14 And it secretly captures, imprisons,
interrogates, and “renders” people to states known to torture.15 Such

11. For examples of current academic reassessment, see Anthony Rapa, Comment, When
Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets
Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 233 (2006), and Erin M. Stilp, Commnet, The Military and State
Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 831 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash Is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen
Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A01 (identifying the warrantless counterterrorist
wiretapping program secretly conducted by the NSA since September 2001 as merely a “slice of a
broader struggle over the power of the presidency” directed, in large part, by Vice President
Cheney).
13. See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on
other grounds, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. Compare Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec.
19, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html
[hereinafter White House Press Briefing] (defending the NSA program), with Memorandum from the
Congressional Research Service on Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (Jan. 5, 2006) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf [hereinafter CRS Report] (concluding that the
executive’s legal justification of the NSA program was not “well-grounded” and a court probably
would not hold it to be valid). See also Carol D. Leonnig, Report Rebuts Bush on Spying: Domestic
Action’s Legality Challenged, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at A01; Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA
Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nybooks
.com/articles/18650.
15.Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp.
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actions (and others we may not know about) make imperative a revived
debate over the wisdom and desirability of the “expansive and
malleable”16 state secrets privilege. As currently applied, it is a
formidable obstacle to civil litigation against the government, an
evisceration of the ability of a citizen injured by such executive acts to
seek redress, oversee government actions, and hold officials accountable
for bad policy or violations of the law.
This paper will first chart the development of the state secrets
privilege as it is currently applied, identifying some of its common law
foundations, its principle articulation in United States v. Reynolds,17 and
its subsequent expansion in Halkin v. Helms [Halkin I]18 and Halkin v.
Helms [Halkin II].19 It will then analyze some of the issues created by
modern application of the privilege, detecting problems it poses both to
separation of powers doctrine and to effective oversight of the executive
branch.
II. HISTORY OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
A. Foundations
In his dissent from the ruling in Halkin I, Judge Bazelon noted that
the state secrets privilege is “weakly rooted in our jurisprudence.”20 This
is because before United States v. Reynolds in 1953 there was no
pronouncement of such a privilege in any statute or case. It is also
because Reynolds drew principally upon a contemporary English case in
the formulation of its rule.21 Important principles regarding government
secrecy were, however, developed in early American case law and
presumably it was these principles that induced the Reynolds Court to
assert that “principles which control the application of the privilege
emerge quite clearly from the available precedents.”22
The earliest American case cited by the Supreme Court in Reynolds
to support the state secrets privilege is United States v. Burr, from

2d 530, 532–34 (E.D. Va. 2006). See also Morning Edition: U.S. Acknowledges Existence of Secret
CIA Prisons, (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story
/story.php?storyId=5780585.
16. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
17. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
18. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
19. 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
20. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 14.
21. See discussion infra Part II.B. See also Rapa, supra note 11, at 237–40 for further
discussion of the English common law roots of an executive secrecy privilege.
22. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
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1807.23 Though not mentioned in Reynolds, one commentator also
identified principles justifying government secrecy as early as 1803 in
Marbury v. Madison.24 Both of these cases involved claims by members
of the Jefferson administration of an executive privilege to refuse
evidence to the courts.
Marbury was a civil case in which the plaintiff, a Federalist
appointed at the last minute by the outgoing Adams administration,
sought to compel the new Democratic Republican officials to admit that
his commission indeed existed and was in their possession. The new
administration based their refusal on the confidentiality prerogative of
executive branch offices. The Court soundly rejected this theory25
because whether the commission existed or not was deemed not to be a
fact that required the protection afforded by secrecy.26 From this case
Halperin and Hoffman identified two general principles regarding
government secrecy: “that there exists, in principle, a category of
privileged, ‘confidential’ executive communications; but that the Court,
in a proper case, has power to review the propriety of a claim of
privilege.”27
Burr, on the other hand, was a criminal case28 in which the defendant
sought to compel production of letters written to President Jefferson both
to impeach the main prosecution witness and embarrass the
administration internationally. Again the government refused, this time
because of the private nature of the communications between the
president and his advisor.29 John Marshall, sitting as justice on the circuit
court, held that the defendant’s need for the evidence and the
government’s need for secrecy must be weighed against each other, and
that a defendant’s need would not always be overridden by the
government’s privilege.30 Justice Marshall ordered production of the
letters requested and President Jefferson complied, with portions of the

23. See id. at 7 n.18 (citing U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807)).
24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 99–100
(discussing Marbury v. Madison).
25. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 141–42.
26. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 100.
27. Id.
28. This distinction is important because it was used by the Court in Reynolds in refusing to
apply by analogy the consequences of the government’s refusal to produce evidence in criminal
cases (i.e., the accused goes free) to the civil forum. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
Nevertheless, the Reynolds court did cite to Burr as precedent for executive secrecy. Id. at 7 n. 18.
29. U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 31 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807).
30. Id. at 37 (“If [the letter] does contain any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose,
which it is not the wish of the executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and
essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be suppressed.” (emphasis added)).
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letters deleted.31 It is important to note that in making his order, Justice
Marshall was aware of the content of the letters32 and, while still showing
due respect to a coequal branch of government, did not accept the
executive’s assertions at face value.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were only
very rare occasions on which the executive branch thought it necessary
to use secrecy, though it treated many of these occasions as opportunities
to carve out a small area of executive privilege.33 All of these occasions
involved foreign diplomacy or war, and the reaction of Congress and
private citizens was always to deny executive claims of an inherent,
unlimited prerogative to withhold information.34 One important
precedent to come from this period was Totten v. United States35 in
which the Court denied a suit for unpaid wages by the administrator of a
Civil War spy’s estate. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent had a
secret contract with the late President Lincoln for espionage services. In
denying the administrator’s claim, the Court reasoned,
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards
as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to
be violated. . . . Much greater reason exists for the application of the
principle to cases of contract for secret services with the government,
as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be
disclosed.36

Later courts would call on this general principle of secrecy to support
their arguments against allowing into evidence secret information that
“might compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or
endanger the person or injure the character of the agent”37 if disclosed.
It was not until World War II, however, that this general principle
was institutionalized in the form of a broad and pervasive secrecy
31. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 100.
32. Id. at 101.
33. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 43–50, 331–39 (discussing secrecy in the Jay Treaty
controversy, the Sedition Act, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and President Wilson’s negotiations
at Versailles).
34. Id. See also HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 98–115. This is not to say that there
were no other occasions in case law in which a governmental evidentiary privilege was recognized
by American courts. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 n.11 (1953). In each of these cases, however,
the privilege was highly individualized and strictly limited by the courts.
35. 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
36. Id. at 107.
37. Id. at 106.
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privilege. Secrecy was utilized more frequently in the context of a dire
global war and, therefore, was progressively legitimized as a tool for
regular instead of rare use.38 After Germany and Japan surrendered, the
Allied Nations split into communist and democratic blocks and the need
for secrecy (or, at least, the perception of a need for secrecy) continued
into peacetime.
B. The Growth of Secrecy and United States v. Reynolds
As the nation settled into its role as a global superpower and the
principal adversary to the communist nations after World War II, the
consistent sense of threat gave national security an enhanced and
permanent importance and fueled the executive’s newfound penchant for
secrecy.39 Presidents Truman and Eisenhower issued Executive Orders
that extended the legitimacy of classifying information into peacetime,
and expanded the authority to classify from the military into nearly all
executive departments.40 These orders accompanied the growth of the
peacetime military and intelligence communities who harbored an innate
belief in secrecy as necessity (and, arguably, the belief that no secrecy
was excessive).41 In this context, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Reynolds42 in 1953 and thereby defined the parameters of the
state secrets privilege.
In Reynolds, an Air Force research and development flight crashed in
Georgia killing six of its nine passengers. Widows of the civilian victims
brought suit against the government claiming negligence and, during
discovery, moved for production of the official investigation reports and
survivors’ statements held by the Air Force. Alleging that disclosure of
these documents threatened to reveal military technology secrets, and
therefore threatened national security, the government moved to quash
the plaintiffs’ motion for discovery.43 In support of its motion, the
government cited only an internal Air Force regulation prohibiting
dissemination of official reports “to persons outside the authorized chain

38. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 117–19, 339.
39. Id. at 339–45.
40. Id. at 340. See also Note, Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and
Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1189–1207 (1972) [hereinafter National Security & Civil
Liberties] (giving an overview of the information security system of the executive branch, including
Executive Orders 10501 and 11652, neither of which had any statutory basis).
41. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 340–41, 344; Zagel, supra note 7, at 898 (listing
problematic national security classifications by the executive departments).
42. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). “In the instant case we cannot escape judicial notice that this is a time
of vigorous preparation for national defense.” Id. at 10.
43. Id. at 1–4.
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of command without the specific approval of the Secretary of the Air
Force.”44
Later, the Secretary of the Air Force filed a formal “Claim of
Privilege,” which stated that compulsion of the evidence sought by
plaintiffs would be prejudicial to national security, and indicated,
specifically yet without revealing the information he sought to protect,
how disclosure would harm the security interest. This claim was
accompanied by an affidavit from the Air Force Judge Advocate General
reiterating the threat that production posed to the nation’s security and
offering to produce the three survivors who could testify about anything
that was not classified.45
Both the district court46 and the Third Circuit47 held for the plaintiffs,
finding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 required production of
the requested documents.48 The law seemed clear. The Federal Tort
Claims Act divested the federal government of sovereign immunity and
applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against the government.49
Air Force regulations creating a privilege to withhold could not trump
such express congressional intent. There was no statute authorizing the
Air Force’s claim of privilege,50 neither was there judicial precedent
clearly on point for such a claim.51 Consequently, the lower courts held
that the government’s refusal to produce the evidence resulted in the
establishment of the facts on the issue of negligence in the plaintiffs’
favor.52
It also seemed clear, however, that strict compliance with the Federal

44. Id. at 4 n.4.
45. Id. at 4–5.
46. Reynolds v. U.S., 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Penn. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
47. Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
48. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 4 (1953).
49. Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F.2d 987, 993 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
50. To be clear, the Air Force motion to quash and “Claim of Privilege” did cite to one
statute—5 U.S.C. § 22—but this merely authorizes “[t]he head of each [executive] department to
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department.” Reynolds,
345 U.S. at 4 n.4. It says nothing about withholding information, but instead vitiates the Air Force
regulation creating the privilege since that regulation was inconsistent with the Tort Claims Act and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One historian to treat the matter concluded that the executive
department’s entire classification system and information protection methods derived entirely from
internal administrative policy for executive employees. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 341. Another
commentator called the Air Force’s citation an illustration of “the Government’s propensity to use
inapposite authority to support policies justified on other grounds,” and noted that Congress
amended the statute after Reynolds, adding: “This section does not authorize withholding
information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.” Zagel, supra note 7,
at 900–01.
51. See U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953) (“Judicial experience with the privilege which
protects military and state secrets has been limited in this country.”).
52. Id. at 5.
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Tort Claims Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
introduce military secrets into the public record. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, reasoning that,
although not directly treated by statute or case law, “the principles which
control the application of the privilege emerge quite clearly from the
available precedents.”53 These principles are: (1) the state secrets
privilege is a public tool and can be asserted by the government only; (2)
the privilege is not to be lightly invoked; (3) the government must follow
proper procedure in invoking a claim to the privilege; (4) the courts
retain limited judicial oversight of the privilege’s use;54 and (5) the
privilege, once applied, is absolute.55
The Court enumerated three procedural requirements: the complaint
must be formal, “lodged by the head of the department which has control
over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.”56
There are two likely sources for these procedural requirements. One
source is certainly English case law, specifically Duncan v. Cammell,
Laird & Co.,57 cited by the Supreme Court in its decision.58 In addition to
Duncan, the allusions to a secrecy privilege in early American case law
such as Marbury and Burr may have inspired the modern-day procedural
requirements, though this inspiration was not ostensibly recognized by
the Court in Reynolds. In each of these early cases President Jefferson
was personally involved in the decision to withhold information, as
opposed to some mid- to low-level administrator making the decision.59
An ostensibly important principle elucidated by Reynolds is judicial
oversight of state secrets claims. The Court held that it “itself must
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege, and yet do so without forcing disclosure of the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.”60 Recognizing the difficulty of this role,
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id. at 7–8.
55. “Where there is a strong showing of necessity [for the evidence], the claim of privilege
should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.” Id. at 11.
56. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
57. (1942) 111 A.C. 624. (K.B.). See generally Zagel, supra note 7, at 888–91 (discussing the
influence of Duncan on Reynolds).
58. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.15, 20–22.
59. Subsequent to Reynolds this procedural requirement became the only part of the state
secrets privilege rule to be strictly enforced against the government. See, e.g., Nat’l Lawyers Guild
v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a formal claim of privilege is
required for each item for which protection from discovery is sought, and that the FBI could not use
a sampling technique in making its state secrets claim); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (holding that the court would not recognize a state secrets claim until it had been made by a
responsible officer who had personally considered it).
60. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
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the Court formulated what has come to be known as the “reasonable
danger” standard: while judicial control over evidence must be
maintained, where the executive can show that there is a reasonable
danger that compelled disclosure of the evidence will expose sensitive
information, the court should not insist upon examining the evidence in
question, even in camera, and should determine that the privilege
applies.61
The curtailed role of the courts in assessing the validity of a state
secrets claim has been a target of criticism in litigation and commentary.
According to Zagel, one of the earliest to examine the state secrets
privilege, Duncan limited “the judge’s function in state secrets cases . . .
to ascertaining whether the claim is made by the proper officer in the
proper form,”62 that is, a judge must only consider whether the
procedural requirement had been met. Zagel argued that Reynolds was an
ultimately futile attempt at compromise between the lower courts’
permissive enforcement of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the English courts’ rubber-stamp approval of executive
procedure.63 Writing before the Halkin decisions, he prophetically
concluded that
there is no middle ground and that the Reynolds compromise is illusory.
In the final analysis, if the court does not examine the information, it
must decide in the dark. Thus, the executive will almost always
determine the legal question of privilege. For all practical purposes, the
rules of Reynolds and Duncan are identical. . . . The issue of whether
the court should make an independent examination of the material in
question or simply accept the executive’s sworn assertion of the
privilege, remains unresolved.64

Thus, although Reynolds sought to balance the role of the judiciary in
controlling the evidence in its courts with the executive’s need for
secrecy, the rule it adopted was fated to favor executive claims of
secrecy and encourage abdication of judicial oversight of such claims.

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 10.
Zagel, supra note 7, at 888.
Id. at 891.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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C. The Halkin Catch-22:65 Abdication of Oversight by the Judiciary
The influence of Duncan on American state secrets jurisprudence has
been underestimated, considering the subsequent application of the
Reynolds “reasonable danger” standard in Halkin I66 and Halkin II.67 In
principle, “[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case [has not been]
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”68 In practice, however, the
role of the courts has become merely to ensure that the executive has
complied with the formalities of invoking the privilege.69 This result was
realized chiefly by the two District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions that dispensed with the Halkin plaintiffs’ cases.
Along with the rise of the national security apparatus—intelligence
agencies, classification systems, security bureaucracies, and a peacetime
military establishment—came highly controversial national policies that
engendered significant dissent in the American public, such as the
Vietnam War. Additionally, technological advances have enabled
increasingly furtive surveillance by the government. This approaching
perfect storm needed one more element to break— an increasingly
paranoid and secretive executive branch, which reached its zenith with
the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency.
1. Halkin I: The sophisticated intelligence analyst, inconsistent
invocation, and absolutism
Halkin was among various other protesters against the Vietnam War
who were subjects of warrantless and, therefore, arguably illegal
surveillance by the NSA.70 Such surveillance was commonly requested
by intelligence agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the late 1960s
and early 1970s.71 The targeted protesters sued for declaratory and
injunctive relief against two particular NSA programs: MINARET and
SHAMROCK. The MINARET program used “watchlists” with the
plaintiffs’ names on them to search for them in mountains of data
collected from overseas electronic communications, while the
65. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 7, at 340.
66. Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
67. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
68. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953).
69. See HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 104.
70. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1)–(22) (2002) (Title III of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime
Control Act of 1968 prohibits interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications
without a warrant).
71. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 4–5.
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SHAMROCK program did likewise with plaintiffs’ telegraphic
communications.72 Details about SHAMROCK had been disclosed
previously in congressional hearings and in the proceedings of Jabara v.
Kelley.73
The NSA responded with a motion for dismissal, arguing that
discovery and merely filing a responsive pleading would require them to
disclose secret information, which would severely jeopardize the
agency’s intelligence collection mission.74 On the other hand, the danger
of dismissal was obvious: perhaps the Nixon administration really had
used the NSA to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional protections through
illegal surveillance and the claim of national security was yet another
cover-up attempt to avoid liability. Carefully weighing the needs of each
side, the district court decided for the defendants with regard to
MINARET, but held that prior disclosures about SHAMROCK negated
the state secrets privilege and discovery of such evidence would be
compelled.75 Both parties appealed.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit decided that both programs fell within
the purview of the state secrets privilege. Three issues of particular
import surfaced in coming to that conclusion: (1) whether the state
secrets privilege could extend to something so minimal as plaintiffs’
request for affirmation or denial that their communications had been
intercepted; (2) whether prior disclosures about SHAMROCK barred
application of the state secrets privilege; and (3) whether the plaintiffs
were improperly denied an opportunity to test the defendant’s claims
because of their exclusion from in camera proceedings.76 In resolving
each of these issues, the court accomplished a piecemeal abdication of its
judicial oversight responsibility.
a. The sophisticated intelligence analyst. Plaintiffs made a minimal
request for a “yes-or-no” answer to the question of whether they had
been monitored. In denying that request, the court opined that any
answer could jeopardize national security. In its rationale, the court
created the “sophisticated intelligence analyst” standard as a subset of the
“reasonable danger” standard articulated in Reynolds.77 Borrowing
language from United States v. Marchetti,78 a First Amendment prior
72. Id.
73. 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
74. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id. at 5–9.
77. Id. at 9–10 (“There is a ‘reasonable danger’ that confirmation or denial that a particular
plaintiff’s communications have been acquired would disclose NSA capabilities and other valuable
intelligence information to a sophisticated intelligence analyst.” (internal citations omitted)).
78. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
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restraint dispute between the CIA and a former employee, the court
justified its profound deference to executive assertions:
The significance of one item of information may frequently depend
upon knowledge of many other items of information. What may seem
trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a
broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of
information in its proper context. The courts, of course, are ill-equipped
to become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve
effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in that area.79

Almost anything could be deemed useful by a sophisticated intelligence
analyst. With this liberal standard in place, the executive has an
exceedingly wide scope of information that can claim to be within the
protection of the state secrets privilege. Indeed, the liberality of this
standard of review is one of the most frequent criticisms of the state
secrets doctrine in particular, and government secrecy in general.80 This
broad standard is one of the steps the court took away from meaningful
evaluation of the executive’s claims for the need for secrecy, and toward
the role of rubber-stamping fulfillment of the procedural requirements.
b. Inconsistent invocation of the privilege. The plaintiffs in Halkin I
argued that the government’s admission to having intercepted
communications in the public record of Jabara was indistinguishable
from the information they sought to obtain through their interrogatories
about SHAMROCK. They argued, therefore, that the information should
be removed from the domain of state secrets since it was no longer a
secret at all. The D.C. Circuit summarily rejected this argument under the
“sophisticated intelligence analyst” standard, holding that “[t]he
government is not estopped from concluding in one case that disclosure
is permissible while in another case it is not.”81 This is a curious
argument for the skeptic of government secrecy. It is difficult to imagine
what an enemy analyst might deduce about the NSA’s capabilities from
disclosure of the fact that it intercepted Mr. Halkin’s communications
that such an analyst could not have already discovered with knowledge
about the interception of Mr. Jabara’s communications. Of course, the
reply prescribed by the sophisticated intelligence analyst standard to this

79. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8–9 (citing U.S. v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972)).
80. Christopher Brancart, Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 9–13
(1987); Gardner, supra note 8, at 585–86; Zagel, supra note 7, at 878–80; Military & State Secrets
Privilege, supra note 7, at 573–76; National Security & Civil Liberties, supra note 40, at 1134–89.
See also supra note 34 and accompanying text as well as discussion infra Part III.B.2.
81. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9.
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skepticism would be that only executive officials and foreign intelligence
analysts could know the difference, and citizens and judges are simply
incompetent to assess the executive’s assertion. It seems more plausible,
however, that this reasoning is a more complex way for the court to say,
“We defer to the executive in everything on national security.” The
court’s extensive use of the sophisticated intelligence analyst standard is
tantamount to complete deference to the executive will in matters of
secrecy.
c. Absolutism. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that their exclusion from
the lower court’s in camera review of classified executive affidavits
showing the need for secrecy yielded too much control over the case to
the NSA.82 As an example, they pointed to the district court’s nearly
verbatim inclusion of the defense counsel’s findings of fact into its
opinion. Plaintiffs claimed a right to be included, under protective order,
in the in camera proceedings.83 The court rejected this assertion holding
that “[t]he state secrets privilege is absolute”84 and overrides any other
competing interest, no matter how compelling. Here plaintiffs were
seeking the “benefit of criticism and illumination by [the] party with the
actual interest in forcing disclosure,” but the court concluded that not
even well-informed and balanced advocacy can outweigh the value of
protecting a state secret. 85
The court’s logic is circular: The plaintiffs may not participate in the
determination of whether the state secrets privilege applies because the
privilege is absolute once applied. Accordingly, the court held that
plaintiffs may not even participate under a protective order because of
the mere potentiality that revealing sensitive information might be too
advantageous to plaintiffs to resist violating the order. This reasoning
reveals the imbalance of the court’s deferential evaluation of claims of
executive privilege. Whereas on one side the risk of disclosure of
allegedly sensitive information is weighted so heavily as to prevent
normal adjudicative proceedings fundamental to justice, on the other side
the risk of abuse of the state secrets privilege to shield illegal actions,
incompetence, waste, or negligence did not seem to weigh at all on the
court’s application of the Reynolds rule. Once again, it becomes clear
that the underlying thrust of the court’s reasoning is absolute deference
to the executive. If an executive official merely invokes the state secrets
privilege, a court must defer to executive judgment and allow secrecy,
even before the court makes any independent determination that the
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6–7 (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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privilege is appropriate. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit was explicit in its
opinion on the matter, stating, “[c]ourts should accord the ‘utmost
deference’ to executive assertions of privilege upon grounds of military
or diplomatic secrets.”86
Because the state secrets privilege afforded some defendants, namely
the NSA, an airtight lock around the evidence necessary to prove the
plaintiffs’ case, the lower court dismissed the complaint as to those
defendants on remand.87
2. Halkin II: Strengthening state secrets
After dismissal of the complaint against the NSA on remand, the
plaintiffs renewed their action against the other intelligence agencies that
remained in Halkin II. They argued that although the state secrets
privilege prevented discovery of the NSA programs at issue, it did not
foreclose a case against the CIA for having submitted the watchlists to
the NSA “on a presumption that the submission of a name resulted in
interception of the named person’s communications.”88 To show their
injury, the plaintiffs required evidence that they were included on the
CIA lists submitted to the NSA for surveillance. Discovery in the district
court revealed that some of the CIA’s domestic surveillance programs,
including Operation CHAOS, had targeted many of the plaintiffs.
Through these programs, the CIA collaborated with other security
agencies, including the FBI and the NSA, to produce a steady stream of
reports on the plaintiffs and to infiltrate their organizations with
undercover agents.89 This revelation and other public disclosures about
the intelligence programs led to still further discovery requests.90 The
CIA produced many of the documents requested, but asserted the state
secrets privilege in withholding much of the evidence crucial to
establishing the plaintiffs’ claims. When the district court upheld the
claim of privilege and subsequently dismissed the case on summary
judgment, the plaintiffs appealed.91
86. Id. at 9 (citing U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). It should be noted that the
statement in Nixon on which the court relies is dicta which relies itself on dicta from an earlier case
superseded by Reynolds. Gardner, supra note 8, at 588 (“The discussion in Nixon that the
constitutional basis of the state secrets privilege derives from the President’s Article II powers, itself
pure dicta, is based upon language in precedent which is also dicta, and which has been seriously
questioned. . . .” (quoting Barry A. Stulberg, Comment, State Secrets Privilege: The Executive
Caprice Runs Rampant, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 471 (1987)).
87. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 981–83.
90. Id. at 984–85.
91. Id. at 988.
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Once again, the D.C. Circuit decided in favor of the government and
sustained its refusal to produce material evidence. The court’s reasoning
further entrenched its deference to the executive’s assertion of privilege
by severely limiting its consideration of plaintiff’s interest in the crucial
information the CIA withheld. Furthermore, it demonstrated the strength
of its holding in Halkin I that the privilege is absolute by denying the
plaintiffs standing because they could not show injury in fact without the
evidence protected by the privilege.92
a. Limiting the influence of the party seeking disclosure. The
plaintiffs argued that the district court did not balance both parties’
competing interests properly because it afforded great weight to the
government’s need for secrecy with comparatively little regard for the
privilege’s fatal repercussions on the plaintiffs’ case.93 The D.C. Circuit
responded by reiterating the Reynolds rule that “invocation [of the
privilege] must be carefully considered to assure that the proper balance
is struck between the interest of the public and the litigant in vindicating
private rights and the public’s interest in safeguarding of the national
security.”94 But then the court eviscerated this principle by declaring that
“the need for the information demonstrated by the party seeking
disclosure . . . is a factor only in determining the extent of the court’s
inquiry into the appropriateness of the claim.”95 Thus,
the critical feature of the inquiry in evaluating the claim of privilege is
not a balancing of ultimate interests at stake in the litigation. That
balance has already been struck. Rather, the determination is whether
the showing of the harm that might reasonably be seen to flow from
disclosure is adequate in a given case to trigger the absolute right to
withhold the information sought in that case.96

The issue was not whether the lower court compared the parties’ interests
fairly, but whether the government had made a sufficient showing of
“reasonable danger.”97
Given the “sophisticated intelligence analyst” standard discussed
above,98 it was not difficult for the CIA to make a showing that harm
might reasonably result from disclosure.99 The plaintiffs had conceded
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 977–1000 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
See discussion supra Part II.C.1.a.
Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 991–92.
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that the procedural requirement had been met, so the court moved on to
the question of whether the showing itself was adequate.100 The court
called upon the sophisticated intelligence analyst principle to illustrate
that it was “self-evident” that disclosure here posed a reasonable
danger.101 Because the public affidavit so easily met this low standard,
the court did not find it necessary even to reach the plaintiffs’ objection
at having been denied the opportunity to challenge the CIA’s in camera
affidavit in the district court.102
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ analogy to judicial
interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in Vaughn v.
Rosen.103 When refusing to disclose information requested under FOIA,
the executive department claiming exemption must complete a detailed
explanation of its refusal to disclose, often called a Vaughn index.104
Plaintiffs here sought a compromise that would allow the government to
protect information while affording minimal accountability to its
constituents by justifying withholding of information.105 The D.C. Circuit
refused even this in an astonishing display of deference to the executive
branch:
the claim of state secrets privilege is a decision of policy made at the
highest level of the executive branch after consideration of the facts of
the particular case. . . . [W]here the only question is whether
information has been deemed by the executive to be so sensitive as to
pose a risk to national security were it disclosed, a more detailed
statement of the characteristics of the withheld information would serve
no useful end.106

The result was that the need of the party seeking disclosure became
almost irrelevant, a straw man to be got around with a minimal showing
of reasonable danger. The balancing envisioned by the Supreme Court in
Burr and Reynolds was impossible because it

100. Id.
101. Id. at 993.
102. Id. at 995.
103. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
104. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 995 (“. . . a ‘Vaughn index’ itemize[es] each instance of claimed
exemption, describing the document involved, and stating the specific exemption(s) asserted to
apply. The index may be supplemented with representative exhibits . . . and in some cases with in
camera submissions which make evident the need for confidentiality.”).
105. Id. Arguably the plaintiffs hoped to force the point that the intelligence agencies could
not justify refusal to disclose and that the surveillance was in fact part of the Johnson and Nixon
administrations’ illegal covert actions against domestic political opponents.
106. Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
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force[d] the judge to rule in a vacuum. He must determine necessity
without knowing the contents of the requested document and their
value to the requesting party. . . . Since the judge is adrift in a sea of
unknowns, it is hard to imagine a case in which the Government cannot
plausibly argue that military secrets are at stake.107

In this way American state secrets jurisprudence arrived at the English
Duncan rule of extreme deference to the executive. The court essentially
reduced application of the state secrets privilege “to ascertaining whether
the claim is made by the proper officer in the proper form.”108
b. No discovery, no standing. Upon determining that the privilege
applied, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ case for want of
standing.109 The plaintiffs were suing for declaratory and injunctive relief
enforcing the protections of the Fourth Amendment. They argued that the
government had not invoked the privilege to protect discovery of
whether the CIA submitted their names to the NSA, and that submission
of their names implied surveillance of their communications and
sufficient risk of injury such that equitable relief was warranted.110
The court held that for a plaintiff to sustain an injury from
surveillance by the government, the surveillance must be unlawful.
Consequently, for submission itself of the plaintiffs’ names to the NSA
to constitute an injury warranting equitable relief, the plaintiffs must
show that submission might lead to an unlawful search, not merely the
probability of surveillance alone. The problem with the plaintiffs’
position, reasoned the court, is that it was unknown whether the NSA’s
surveillance was unlawful and, because of the state secrets privilege, it is
also unknowable. Therefore, “appellants’ inability to adduce proof of
actual acquisition of their communications now prevents them from
stating a claim cognizable in federal courts. In particular, we find
appellants incapable of making the showing necessary to establish their
standing to seek relief.”111
This is the Halkin Catch-22: plaintiffs are denied discovery of the
very evidence that would save their case from the lack of standing for
which it was dismissed. In other words, when the government is the
defendant it may eviscerate the case against it, first, by invoking the state
secrets privilege, thereby denying the plaintiff the evidence necessary to

107. Zagel, supra note 7, at 891.
108. Id. at 888 (referring to the English rule in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C.
624 (K.B.)).
109. Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 997–1007.
110. Id. at 997.
111. Id. at 998.
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shield from dismissal for lack of standing, failure to state a claim for
which relief can be granted,112 or from summary judgment, and then
move to dismiss because the plaintiff lacks the very evidence the
government is withholding. Herein we see the severity of the state secrets
privilege. The plaintiffs’ prayer for relief from possible Fourth
Amendment violations was destroyed by an unproven, unreviewable,
vague, and cursory assertion by the executive that disclosure might
implicate national security.
III. ANALYSIS
The Reynolds rule, which has metamorphosed into something more
appropriately called the Duncan-Halkin rule, is not compatible with
American constitutional principles. The federal government is one of
separated powers that should preclude the executive from determining
the extent of its own privilege in a lawsuit to which it is a party. Effective
judicial oversight is required to provide a forum in which an aggrieved
citizen may seek redress peacefully. Furthermore, a healthy republic
requires oversight of the government by an informed citizenry.
Systematic secrecy in the government is an obstacle to these ends. For
these reasons, the United States Government should return to the candor
and openness that characterized its control of information before World
War II. As a coequal branch of government, the courts should abandon
the Duncan-Halkin rule for a method of protecting state secrets that is
more amenable to public oversight and redress by reasserting the judicial
oversight it has abandoned over the last 50 years of state secrets
jurisprudence.
A. Separation of Powers
It is improper, indeed a miscarriage of justice, for a man to be a
judge in his own case.113 In essence, this is what the Duncan-Halkin rule
has made of the executive branch in state secrets cases. Arguably,
Reynolds sought to avoid this, asserting, “Judicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers.”114 The Halkin rulings, however, have made judicial oversight
merely nominal, a certification that procedure was followed correctly.
Some have agreed that the Halkin cases are not true to the more
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
113. Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.). See generally JOHN V. ORTH, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY, 15–32 (2003).
114. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953).
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moderate Reynolds rule. One commentator,115 writing between the
Halkin I and Halkin II decisions, noted that lower courts were taking a
mechanical approach to the procedure of Reynolds while ignoring the
Supreme Court’s mandate that “the court must be satisfied from all the
evidence and circumstances, and ‘from the implications of the question,
in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous’”116 in order to find that the claim of privilege is appropriate.
Thus, in the Halkin cases, the D.C. Circuit failed to account for important
distinctions between the claim of privilege there and the claim in
Reynolds, distinctions that may have ameliorated the harsh outcome of
those decisions.117
Another commentator noted that Burr, one of the precedents for
secrecy upon which Reynolds relies, charges the court with responsibility
to balance the ultimate interests of both parties.118 Justice Marshall
identified the need for presidential discretion at times, but concluded that
the requesting party’s “occasion for demanding [privileged evidence]
ought . . . be very strong, and to be fully shown to the court.” He
continued, though, stating that “[p]erhaps the court ought to consider the
reasons, which would induce the president to refuse to exhibit [the
evidence] as conclusive on it, unless such [evidence] could be shown to
be absolutely necessary in the defense [i.e., to the opponent party’s
case].”119 It is clear that Justice Marshall considered a central, informed
role for the court in balancing the “ultimate interests”120 of the party not
asserting the privilege (as opposed to its merely assessing a minimal
showing of reasonable danger by the executive). Of course, Burr was a
criminal case, but there has been no satisfactory rationale offered for the
difference in how the claim of privilege is treated between civil and
criminal cases. To the contrary, civil cases like Reynolds and Halkin I
have cited often to criminal cases that have dealt with claims of
executive privilege based on national security, like Burr and United
States v. Nixon.121 It is clear from the precedents upon which the state
115. Military & State Secrets Privilege, supra note 7, at 573–78.
116. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9.
117. Military & State Secrets Privilege, supra note 7, at 577–78 (“In Reynolds, the executive
was not suspected of intentionally invading the plaintiffs’ rights or of using the privilege to defeat
the plaintiffs’ case. The Supreme Court upheld the privilege . . . after the Secretary [of the Air Force]
provided an alternative source for the information sought by the plaintiffs.”)
118. HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 100.
119. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 55 (Cir. Ct. Va. 1807)) (emphasis added).
120. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.18 (citing to “Marshall, C.J., in the Aaron Burr trial, I
Robertson’s Reports 186”); Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing to U.S. v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
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secrets privilege is founded that the courts are to assert more oversight of
privilege claims.
We can see the challenges to the separation of powers posed by the
state secrets privilege in four recent cases challenging the NSA’s
warrantless counterterrorism surveillance program.122 They illustrate the
power of the executive over the admission of evidence, a right normally
belonging to the courts. As noted in the introduction, the NSA has been
monitoring American citizens without warrants for about five years now.
This warrantless surveillance program has been acknowledged publicly
by the president,123 the U.S. Attorney General,124 and the Department of
Justice.125 Contrary to the Attorney General’s vague assertions about the
program’s legality, the Congressional Research Service concluded that
the wiretapping was probably illegal.126 The ACLU and the Al-Haramain
Islamic Foundation initiated actions against the government for relief
from the allegedly illegal surveillance, much like the plaintiffs in Halkin
I.127 Hepting and Terkel, on the other hand, sued their
telecommunications provider for injuries that flowed from AT&T’s
alleged collaboration with the government in surrendering their records
to the NSA.128 In each case the government moved for dismissal because
discovery and responsive pleadings would involve disclosures that bear
the mere potential of jeopardizing national security. 129
In each case “[t]he courts upheld the privilege as to those alleged
aspects of the program which were not made public, including alleged
tracking of the phone records of millions of Americans, but denied it as
to the aspect which the government publicly disclosed, monitoring
122. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Ore. 2006); Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Terkel v. AT&T
Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
123. President’s Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2005/12/20051217.html
124. White House Press Briefing, supra note 14.
125. U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President, (Jan. 19, 2006) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf.
126. Compare White House Press Briefing, supra note 14 (defending the NSA program), with
CRS Report, supra note 14 at 44 (concluding that the executive’s legal justification of the NSA
program was not “well-grounded” and a court probably would not hold it to be valid). Indeed, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan so held in August, 2006. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 773–759 (holding that the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program
violates the Fourth and First Amendments and the separation of powers).
127. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758; Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc.,
451 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
128. Terkel, 441 F Supp. 2d at 901; Hepting 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
129. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1224–25; Am. Civil Liberties Union,
438 F. Supp. 2d at 758–59; Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 904; Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979–80.
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communications between suspected al Qaeda members based in America
and their cohorts abroad.”130 To uphold the government’s assertion of the
privilege over information that it had publicly acknowledged would be to
make the courts complicit in argument that is “disingenuous and without
merit.”131 The government failed in asserting the privilege only because
of its repeated public disclosures of the program. The courts made it
clear that if the government had kept silent after the NSA program was
leaked the privilege would have upheld.132 Indeed, the standard set forth
in Hepting is that “[i]n determining whether a factual statement is a
secret for purposes of the state secrets privilege, the court should look
only at publicly reported information that possesses substantial indicia of
reliability . . . .”133 Thus, in determining whether information about
AT&T’s cooperation with the NSA was secret or not, the court held that
it “considers only public admissions or denials by the government,
AT&T and other telecommunications companies . . . .”134 In other words,
the admissibility of such evidence is still dependent upon the defendants’
discretion to disclose information. If, in the future, defendants in
possession of sensitive information wish to keep it out of court, they
simply need to refrain from making any public pronouncement about it.
In this way, the executive can control the admissibility of evidence, even
if it is indirectly.
Perhaps the most poignant illustration of this control is found in AlHaramain Islamic Foundation.135 Here, plaintiffs were seeking to admit
evidence that they had been targets of the NSA’s surveillance.136 Defense
counsel inadvertently sent a classified document to plaintiffs’ counsel
which stated that the plaintiffs were, indeed, subjects of surveillance.137
The court held that the information known to all parties was nevertheless
a privileged secret.138 It reasoned,
because the government has not officially confirmed or denied whether
plaintiffs were subject to surveillance, even if plaintiffs know they
were, this information remains a secret. Furthermore, while plaintiffs

130. Rapa, supra note 11, at 260 n.213.
131. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
132. See, e.g., id. at 765 (holding that information which was publicly disclosed is no longer
secret, but that any other information which the government did not choose to acknowledge was
protected, resulting in the dismissal of this part of the ACLU’s claim).
133. 439 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
134. Id.
135. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Ore. 2006).
136. Id. at 1218.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1223, 1228–29.
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know the contents of the Sealed Document, it too remains secret. . . .
[T]he government did not waive its state secrets privilege by its
inadvertent disclosure of the document.”139

That is, even though the NSA surveillance program had been
acknowledged publicly by administration officials, and it had become
common knowledge to all parties that the plaintiffs were subjects of this
program (knowledge that was subsequently published to the world in a
court reporter), it can still be excluded as a state secret! This is, again, the
court allowing the government to “put the cat back in the bag” when it
faces liability.140
If the executive is engaged in illegal activity, it violates the principle
of separation of powers to allow the executive to control what is admitted
into evidence in the trial adjudicating that same activity. By refusing to
admit evidence of such activity unless it is officially acknowledged by
the very party with an interest in excluding it, the Duncan-Halkin rule
gives the executive this undue control, albeit indirectly. Thus, a program
widely believed to violate a federal statute and the Bill of Rights, has
continued unabated and unsupervised, and its victims left without
remedy for injuries already sustained, and without judicial recourse to
protect their constitutional rights in the future. As the D.C. Circuit opined
earlier in Halkin II, these plaintiffs will be left without judicial remedy
and must look to Congress.141
B. Oversight Problems
1. Double abdication
Congress has only rarely been a reliable source for relief from
government abuse of the individual or the minority. More often,
Congress has either ignored an aggrieved individual or joined the
executive in its abuse. The triumph of the individual treated unjustly over
an oppressive majority has been more often the virtue of the courts than
the legislatures. The language in Halkin II, however, denies this forum to
the victims of executive secrecy, and requires them to rely on the
139. Id. at 1223.
140. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.b.
141. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“As in the other cases in which the need
to protect sensitive information affecting the national security clashes with fundamental
constitutional rights of individuals, we believe that ‘(t)he responsibility must be where the power is.’
In the present context . . . this means that remedies for constitutional violations that cannot be proven
under existing legal standards, if there are to be such remedies, must be provided by Congress.”)
(alteration in original, internal citations omitted).
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unreliable—the political will of the national legislature.142
On March 9, 2006 the Senate Intelligence Committee voted, strictly
along partisan lines, not to conduct an investigation into the NSA
wiretapping program143 that Congress’s own legal research center
concluded was probably illegal.144 Its compromise with the White House
condoned continued violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act with enhanced congressional oversight.145 There are good reasons to
believe that this was the politically expedient course of action more than
it was far-sighted, sound judgment, given the intense political pressure
from the White House as well as from the public.146 Congressional
inaction certainly does nothing for those whose communications may
have been unlawfully monitored.
An elected legislature will often abdicate its responsibility to protect
the minority because of its political interest in the majority’s approval.
This was well understood by the Founders and a fundamental reason
behind their creation of a strong and independent judiciary.147 When the
executive violates the constitutional rights of unpopular individuals, the
injured cannot reasonably look to Congress for a remedy in most
circumstances. Yet the Duncan-Halkin rule declares that to be their only
recourse.148 Thus, the wiretapping plaintiffs have the courts foreclosed to
them (to the extent that the government is not willing to admit publicly to
its surveillance) and, after the Senate Intelligence Committee’s
compromise, they have no recourse in Congress either. This inability of
an individual to stop illegal actions by his government contravenes the
principles of civil liberty prized by Americans.
The inability for the aggrieved to seek redress in the courts extends
well beyond the interception of communications into much more serious
territory. The allegations brought by Maher Arar and Khaled El-Masri
involve kidnapping, illegal detention, and torture by federal government
officials—the nightmare scenario feared by those wary of a police
state.149 Each was detained, secretly and without warrant, while
142. See id.
143. See, e.g., Scott Shane & David D. Kirkpatrick, G.O.P. Plan Would Allow Spying Without
Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A20.
144. CRS Report, supra note 14, at 42–44.
145. Shane & Kirkpatrick, supra note 143, at A20.
146. See, e.g., Gail R. Chaddock, Behind the Deal on NSA Wiretaps, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 9, 2006, at 1 (ascribing the shift of congressional attention from investigating the
NSA program to challenging the controversial Dubai ports deal to political desire to appear strong
on national security and to avoid the appearance of weakening counterterrorism measures taken by
President Bush).
147. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
148. See supra note 141.
149. See supra note 6.
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traveling.150 They allege that they were held against their wills by
American agents, brutally interrogated, and then “rendered” to locales
within foreign nations, where they were detained without charge or trial
for several months and tortured routinely.151 After their captors (and
presumably the intelligence agencies responsible for their renditions)
were satisfied that they were not threats and did not possess relevant
information, each was released without apology or compensation.152
They brought claims for their injuries against the U.S. government,
which, in a motion to dismiss, invoked the state secrets privilege
claiming that the facts needed to prove their cases are too sensitive to be
disclosed.153 In all likelihood, there are genuine intelligence methods and
potentially embarrassing diplomatic arrangements that require protection
from disclosure in this case. On the other hand, there are also strong
indications of serious executive error and illegal intelligence activity for
which protection is sought in secrecy.154 With strong indications that
“extraordinary renditions” like Mr. Arar’s and Mr. El-Masri’s are fairly
common practice by American intelligence agencies,155 there is a
powerful oversight rationale for these cases to proceed. Congress is
unlikely to be the champion of the cause of suspected terrorists (even
though it is now clear that label is not applicable to Mr. Arar nor, most
likely, to Mr. El-Masri). When political considerations make it unlikely
that the political branches will help the injured, the judiciary is the
recourse that must remain available. Regrettably, the Duncan-Halkin rule
appears to close the doors of the courts as well.156 The Duncan-Halkin
150. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437
F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–33 (E.D. Va. 2006).
151. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253–57; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533–35.
152. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255; El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–34 (E.D. Va.
2006).
153. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 535. See also David Luban,
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1459 (2005).
154. Mr. Arar has been cleared of all suspicion of links to terrorism and the Canadian
government has been unable to find any factual basis for his detention, rendition to Syria,
imprisonment, and torture. REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf. See
also Scott Shane, Torture Victim Had No Terror Link, Canada Told U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2006, at A10; Canadian Inquiry Finds Torture Survivor Maher Arar Completely Innocent, Criticizes
U.S. For ‘Rendition’ to Syria, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.democracynow.org/
article.pl?sid=06/09/19/1348206&mode=thread&tid=25.
155. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Growing
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set up After 9/11, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01; All Things Considered: Bush Concedes CIA Ran Secret Prisons Abroad (NPR
radio broadcast, Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=5776968; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “Outsourcing” Torture, (2004).
156. See, e.g., Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88 (dismissing on national security grounds other
than the state secrets privilege); El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (commenting that “it is worth
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rule allows constitutional liberties to be surrendered too readily to a
privilege for secrecy that is too easily abused.
2. The Secrecy System157
By sacrificing judicial checks on executive power, the DuncanHalkin rule protects government secrecy, whether secrecy is warranted or
not. Ostensibly, we have traded the oversight that acts as guarantor of our
civil liberties for a strong national security. But in practice we have
traded oversight for the ability of the executive to conceal enormous
amounts of public information, often of dubious relevance to national
security, at its own discretion. There are even indications that the
Duncan-Halkin rule’s barrier to effective oversight may actually harm
national security by hiding incompetence or gross error from public
scrutiny, accountability, and correction.158
Secrecy is of limited value to a democratic republic. One
commentator observed in 1966, when it had become apparent that an
American peacetime military would be permanent, that such an
establishment would create new demands for secrecy and encourage its
expansion.159 Concluding that limited secrecy was necessary, he also
identified “limits on its value.”160 One of the limitations to the value of
secrecy was the public’s inability to exercise effective oversight:
“Congress’ ability to supervise the military establishment is a function of
information. An uninformed Congress must either abdicate its power to
the knowledgeable or exercise that power blindly.”161 It hardly needs
mentioning that an ambitious executive would understand and exploit the
opportunities presented by Congress’s ignorance of matters concealed
behind the executive veil of Top Secret classifications. The uninformed
public finds itself in a position similar to that of Congress and,
suspecting government abuse, must be able to enlist the power of the
noting that putting aside all the legal issues, if El-Masri’s allegations are true or essentially true, then
all fair-minded people, including those who believe that state secrets must be protected, that this
lawsuit cannot proceed, and that renditions are a necessary step to take in this war, must also agree
that El-Masri has suffered injuries as a result of our country’s mistake and deserves a remedy. Yet, it
is also clear from the result reached here that the only sources of that remedy must be the Executive
Branch or the Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch.”).
157. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 331–76.
158. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d,
161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005) (suit by former FBI employee
for alleged wrongful termination after “blowing the whistle” on FBI failures related to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 dismissed after the government invoked the state secrets privilege);
and Rapa, supra note 11.
159. Zagel, supra note 7, at 878–80.
160. Id. at 78.
161. Id.
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courts to inform itself. The Duncan-Halkin rule provides for just the
opposite: the concerned citizen may not inform himself even in the most
trivial matters.162
The value of secrecy in a democratic republic is severely limited by
the inseparably-connected lack of oversight that creates substantial
hazards for good government. Secrecy and oversight are opposite points
on a sliding scale: when the law allows a greater portion of secrecy,
oversight is decreased proportionally. The Third Circuit recognized this
in its opinion sustaining the district court’s compulsion of the evidence in
Reynolds:
The present cases themselves indicate the breadth of the claim of
immunity from disclosure which one government department head has
already made. It is but a small step to assert a privilege against any
disclosure of records merely because they might prove embarrassing to
government officers. Indeed it requires no great flight of imagination to
realize that if the Government’s contentions in these cases were
affirmed the privilege against disclosure might gradually be enlarged
by executive determinations until, as is the case in some nations today,
it embraced the whole range of governmental activities.
We need to recall in this connection the words of Edward Livingston:
“No nation ever yet found any inconvenience from too close an
inspection into the conduct of its officers, but many have been brought
to ruin, and reduced to slavery, by suffering gradual imposition and
abuses, which were imperceptible, only because the means of publicity
had not been secured.” And it was Patrick Henry who said that “to
cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an
abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man and every friend to his
country.”163

True to the Third Circuit’s misgivings, the executive branch’s notions of
what falls under the national security label have steadily expanded since
World War II. During the 1950s, the era of Reynolds, the executive
departments’ classification system grew exponentially. Although
spawned by legitimate needs, it soon grew into “an extravagant and
indefensible system of denial.”164 The executive alone monitored its
uncontrolled descent into official secrecy, and “[b]ecause the secrecy
system was controlled by those on whom it bestowed prestige and
162. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
163. Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F.2d 987, 995 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (internal
citations omitted).
164. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 341.
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protection, it had long since overridden its legitimate objectives.”165 By
1972, there were 20 million classified documents, of which “less than
one-half of 1 percent . . . actually contain[ed] information qualifying
even for the lowest defense classification . . . .”166 This culture of secrecy
bred ridiculous and disturbing offspring. Zagel reported that:
The executive has refused . . . to disclose (a) the number and use of
administrative aircraft to a member of Congress; (b) the picture of the
interior of a plush transport plane to a member of Congress; (c)
information on monkey research to the press . . . ; (d) photographs of the
B-58 and the Titan missile to the press even though both were in public
view; (e) a report on a bow and arrow weapon developed during World
War II to the scientist who developed the weapon . . . ; (f) a report on
pollution of ground supply water adjoining an arsenal . . . to a member of
Congress; [and] (g) reports dating back to 1907 of attacks by sharks on
seamen to a group of scientists.167
According to Schlesinger, “when one member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff wrote another saying that too many undeserving papers were being
stamped Top Secret, his note itself was stamped Top Secret.”168
Gardner observed the implications of over-classification on the state
secrets privilege:
One frequent criticism of the Reynolds standard is that the government
can protect almost any type of information from discovery with an
assertion of the state secret privilege. Current standards do not require
that information be classified as secret; nor do the standards require that
the information not be in the public domain. Knowledge regarding
nearly any aspect of our country is valuable to an enemy. Obviously,
information such as the location of missile silos, training methodology
for special forces, satellite locations, and weapon designs would assist
an enemy and should receive protection from public disclosure.
However, information such as the distance between Charlotte and
Washington, the dates and locations of Air Force shows, the locations
of banks, the type of food the President enjoys also would be useful
information to an enemy and could “potentially prejudice” the nation’s
security.169

Although his comparison may seem absurd, stranger protections have
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 344.
Id. (quoting testimony of a former Pentagon security officer).
Zagel, supra note 7, at 898.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 344.
Gardner, supra note 8, at 585–86 (internal citations omitted).
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occurred. To be sure, the D.C. Circuit ratified such behavior by the
executive when it upheld the NSA’s claim of privilege for information
that already had been “let out of the bag.”170
The problem with excessive secrecy goes deeper than its silliness or
even its costs. It lies in the fact that “almost any information can qualify
as privileged”171 because of the expansive scope of the information that
arguably could pose a reasonable danger to the national security. It need
not actually present a security risk, but must bear merely the potentiality
of risk. This minimal standard, which does not provide a method for
distinguishing information that truly merits protection from information
that is trivial or that demonstrates wrongdoing or incompetence,
transforms the executive’s claim of privilege into a practically
irrebuttable presumption of privilege. This standard “renders review of
such claims perfunctory.”172
Why take secrecy to such an extreme level? The presidential
historian Arthur Schlesinger saw three advantages accruing to the
executive: the power to withhold, the power to leak, and the power to
lie.173 By withholding “knowledge that would make possible an
independent judgment on executive policy” the executive can “defend
[its] national security monopoly and prevent democratic control of
foreign policy.”174
The power to leak allows the executive “to tell the people what it
serve[s] the government’s purpose that they should know.”175 This
principle was amply demonstrated in the current Bush administration’s
arguments for the war in Iraq. Its convenient selection of questionable
evidence that supported its claims and retention of more reliable
evidence that contradicted them is the archetype of this power to leak.
The executive’s hypocrisy on the protection of national security
information is the great elephant in the courtroom during state secrets
cases. The Carter administration leaked information about the secret
Stealth bomber reportedly to rebut political opponents who claimed that
the nation’s defenses had deteriorated during his presidency,176 and then
claimed secrecy was essential to protect the Vietnam-era domestic
spying in the Halkin cases. The current Bush administration leaked the
identity of an undercover CIA agent reportedly to punish her husband, a

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See discussion supra Part II.C.1.b and supra note 140 and accompanying text.
Military & State Secrets Privilege, supra note 7, at 579.
Id.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 354–57.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 355.
Military & State Secrets Privilege, supra note 7, at 580 n.61.
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diplomat who published an essay refuting the administration’s
allegations about Iraqi weaponry.177 One may assert, almost without any
doubt, that if such information had been the subject of a plaintiff’s
discovery, the state secrets privilege would have been invoked
successfully and the information would have remained secret. This
shows that the executive will use secrecy arbitrarily and inconsistently to
serve its own purposes. Indeed, without any objective and external
standard to act as a check, there is nothing to stop it from so doing.
The third advantage is the power to lie. Uncontrolled secrecy allows
the executive to falsify and dissemble whenever doing so is easier and
more expedient than taking responsibility or conforming to the rule of
law. It also “instill[s] in the executive branch the idea that foreign policy
[and, I would add, national security] [are] no one’s business save its
own . . . .”178 The diplomatic and military establishments then become
free to engage in the business of securing their own interests regardless
of the consequences to the public.
These advantages gained from secrecy can be seen in the state
secrets context. Returning to the Halkin and ACLU cases, if we assume
that the NSA surveillance was illegal for the sake of argument, the
secrecy and the deferential standards applied to the state secrets privilege
would provide a safe harbor from prosecution and liability for
wrongdoing. What is worse, they would encourage further wrongdoing
because of the practical immunity from responsibility afforded by the
privilege.
The Constitution, though ironically conceived in secrecy itself,
created a government that would rely on a well-informed public for
support. Extensive, routine, institutionalized secrecy that gives the
government undue control over public information is not compatible
with that requirement for good government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The War Against Terrorism presents special needs for secrecy and
special problems with its use. The executive branch during the War
Against Terrorism has strong incentives, as in the Cold War, to withhold
information. Some incentives are legitimate, but some stem from the
desire to operate in areas of doubtful constitutionality and legality with
impunity and without oversight. The tendency in times of fear is to
accept legal measures that are immediately expedient. But,
177. See, e.g., CNN, Bush Acknowledges Declassifying Intelligence, Apr. 11, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/10/whitehouse.leak/index.html.
178. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 356.
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paradoxically, the present security crisis introduces an ideal opportunity
to reassess the state secrets privilege, to recalibrate the application of
Reynolds to claims of privilege. Many viable alternatives have been
suggested.179 Furthermore, contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s dicta in Halkin
II,180 the Reynolds decision is not a constitutional mandate, but is based
in evidentiary and procedural principles.181 Neither is it founded in the
federal statutes. Therefore it is open to change by the courts, and change
is certainly needed. The courts or Congress should strike a balance that
gives more weight to disclosure of public information, and that denies
government secrecy as the rule. The Duncan-Halkin formulation should
be rejected and the state secrets privilege should not obtain until it has
been shown that a dire, substantial, and actual threat to national security
will arise from disclosure.
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